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ABSTRACT 
An experiment replicated and extended recent 
findings on psychologically realistic ways of 
modeling propagation of uncertainty in rule 
based reasoning. Within a single production 
rule, the antecedent evidence can be 
summarized by taking the maximum of 
disjunctively connected antecedents and the 
minimum of conjunctively connected 
antecedents. The maximum certainty factor 
attached to each of the rule's conclusions can 
be scaled down by multiplication with this 
summarized antecedent certainty.  
Beckerman's modified certainty factor 
technique can be used to combine certainties 
for common conclusions across production 
rules. 
INTRODUCTION 
Rule based systems have proven to be 
successful techniques for the computational 
modeling of human reasoning. They can be 
used to model human procedural knowledge in 
a convenient, homogeneous, modular fashion 
that is consistent with a great deal of 
psychological evidence (Klahr, Langley, & 
Neches, 1987). 
Curiously, very few of the rule based human 
simulations employ techniques for 
representing and propagating uncertainty. 
Although it is widely acknowledged that much 
of human knowledge is uncertain, it is in the 
field of artificial intelligence that research on 
the representation and management of 
uncertainty in rule based reasoning has been 
focused (Kanal & Lemmer, 1986; Hink & 
Woods, 1987). Most of the work on 
uncertainty in artificial intelligence has so far 
been normative, stressing issues of 
mathematical correctness and effectiveness. 
The approach taken in this paper is not 
normative, but descriptive. It seeks to 
determine how ordinary reasoners propagate 
uncertainty in the context of rule based 
reasoning. 
The problem of uncertainty in rule based 
architectures can be broken into two sub­
problems. One concerns how the possibly 
uncertain evidence in a rule's antecedents 
affects the rule's conclusions. Consider the 
general case of a production rule with i 
antecedents and j conclusions. 
IF antecedent 1 
antecedent2 
. 
antecedenti 
TiffiN conclusion! (maximum-cf1) 
. 
conclusionj (maximum-c�) 
Attached to each of the rule's j conclusions 
would typically be a numerically represented 
maximum certainty factor. If the evidence 
contained in the rule's antecedents is believed 
with perfect certainty, then each conclusionj 
would be drawn with its maximum-certainty­
factor} However, in the general case, the 
evidence in each of the rule's antecedents is 
believed with varying degrees of certainty. 
How should the uncertainty of antecedent 
evidence be summarized? And how should 
this summarized antecedent certainty affect the 
maximum certainty factor of each conclusion? 
Slightly complicating the frrst question is the 
fact that the antecedents can be connected 
either conjunctively or disjunctively. With 
conjunctive connectives, all of the antecedents 
must hold in order for the rule to fire. For 
disjunctive connectives, satisfaction of only a 
single antecedent enables the rule to fire. 
The other uncenainty sub-problem in rule 
based systems concerns the issue of 
combining evidence across different rules with 
the same conclusion. Imagine that a particular 
conclusion exists in more than one rule. As 
rules fire, their conclusions come to be 
believed with varying degrees of cenainty, as 
just outlined. How should these cenainties be 
combined in cases where a previously frred 
rule has an overlapping conclusion with a 
newly frred rule? This is not a problem in 
deterministic production systems that do not 
quantify uncertainty since they typically avoid 
drawing the same conclusion more than once. 
However, it is a problem in any production 
system that attempts to propagate quantitative 
uncenainties as its rules frre. 
Solution of these two sub-problems is critical 
for rule based effons to model human 
cognition because algorithms implementing a 
solution to each of these two sub-problems are 
typically invoked every time a rule with 
quantitative representation of uncenainty fires. 
If these algorithms lack psychological validity, 
simulation errors will tend to accumulate and 
compound as rules fire. 
A recent psychological experiment evaluated a 
number of different solutions to these 
problems (Shultz, Zelazo, & Engelberg, 
1989). In a study of the problem of 
propagating uncenainty within a rule, subjects 
learned hypothetical production rules in which 
each of three antecedents was believed with 
varying degrees of cenainty. A maximum 
certainty factor for each rule's conclusion was 
also specified. Subjects were then asked to 
rate the cenainty with which they believed the 
rule's conclusion. Seven different quantitative 
models for summarizing the antecedent 
certainty and two models for using this 
summarized antecedent certainty to scale down 
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the maximum cenainty factor in the rule's 
conclusion were evaluated. 
The results indicated that the best fitting model 
for summarizing antecedent cenainties was the 
so-called maximin model, which took the 
maximum cenainty factor from disjunctively 
connected antecedents and the minimum 
certainty factor from conjunctively connected 
antecedents. The better technique for scaling 
down the maximum certainty factor in the 
conclusion was to multiply the maximum 
certainty factor by this summarized antecedent 
certainty factor. 
Among the alternative, less successful models 
for summarizing antecedent cenainties were 
minimum, maximum, product, sum minus 
overlap, mean, and median. The best-fitting 
maximin model was a hybrid model 
combining the maximum and minimum 
models. Another assessed hybrid model 
combined the product and sum minus overlap 
models. It used the product of conjunctively 
connected antecedent cenainties and the sum 
minus overlap of disjunctively connected 
antecedent certainties. 
The less successful model for scale down the 
maximum cenainty factor in the rule's 
conclusion was a model that computed the 
mean of this value and the summarized 
antecedent certainty. 
In a second experiment, Shultz et al. (1989) 
compared five different quantitative models for 
combining cenainties across rules with the 
same conclusion. Here, subjects learned two 
rules relevant to the same conclusion, each of 
which had antecedent evidence of varying 
certainty. They were asked to rate the cenainty 
of the common conclusion. Two models for 
scaling down the conclusion's maximum 
cenainty factor by the antecedent certainty 
were also tested, with the same result as in the 
frrst experiment. That is, scaling was better 
approximated by multiplication than by 
computing the mean. Two models for 
combining cenainties across rules fit the data 
equally well: the classic cenainty factor 
approach used in MYCIN (Shonliffe, 1976) 
and Heckerman's (1986) modified certainty 
factor approach, which sums the cenainties 
contributed by each of two rules and divides 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
by 1 plus their product. Heckennan's model 
was favored over the tri-partite classic 
certainty factor approach because it employs a 
simpler, more unified formula. 
Heckerman (1986) showed that both his 
modified certainty factor model and the classic 
certainty factor approach are valid probabilistic 
interpretations of certainty factors, under the 
assumptions that the evidence provided by the 
rules is conditionally independent and that the 
rule base forms a tree structure. Grosof (1986) 
showed that Heckerman's modified certainty 
factor model is equivalent to a special case of 
Dempster-Shafer theory. We found that the 
Dempster-Shafer technique (as described in 
Gordon & Shortliffe, 1984) yielded identical 
results to the classic certainty factor model 
when both of two rules either confirmed or 
disconfmned a conclusion but differed slightly 
when one rule was confmning and the other 
was disconfmning. 
Other, less successful models for combining 
certainties across rules included those that 
computed the mean, maximum, or minimum 
of the two certainties. 
A criticism addressed to these conclusions at 
the meeting in which they were frrst presented 
was that the problem had been broken into 
unrealistically small parts. It was argued that 
the favored algorithms might not work on 
more natural problems that required full 
integration of all of the algorithmic elements. 
The purpose of the present study was to 
address this critique by using problems that 
required full integration of the algorithms. 
METHOD 
The subjects were 44 university student 
volunteers. On each of 12 items, they learned 
two production rules said to express 
independent sources of evidence for event X. 
For example, 
If events A, B, and C all happen, then 
event X is highly certain to happen. 
Event A is highly certain to happen. 
Event B moderately certain to happen. 
Event C is slightly certain to happen. 
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If event D, E, or F happens, then event X 
is moderately certain not to happen. 
Event D is highly certain to happen. 
Event E moderately certain to happen. 
Event F is slightly certain to happen. 
In each item, the subject was asked to rate the 
certainty of event X happening by placing a 
slash on a 16 em line with certain not to 
happen anchoring the left end, certain to 
happen anchoring the right end, and uncertain 
labelling the midpoint 
Across the 12 rule items there was systematic 
variation in the type of connective for the 
antecedents (conjunctive vs. disjunctive) and 
the certainty and direction of the conclusion 
(highly vs. moderately certain to happen vs. 
not-happen). 
As in the original experiments (Shultz et al., 
1989), additional items were presented at the 
end of this questionnaire in order to calibrate 
each subject's use of the certainty descriptors 
highly, moderately, and slightly certain. For 
each of these certainty descriptors, the subject 
was asked to place a slash on a 16 em line to 
represent the described degree of certainty. 
The calibration line was anchored at one end 
with uncertain and at the other end with 
completely certain. 
Two different forms of the questionnaire were 
created by using two different random orders 
of the same 12 items. Each of the two forms 
was given to 22 subjects. 
The letters symbolizing events in these items 
(A, B, C) were not instantiated with more 
realistic events. It was part of the research 
strategy to begin with these abstract items 
before investigating the effects of context on 
reasoning under uncertainty. 
RESULTS 
Responses to the calibration items were 
converted to certainty factors by measuring the 
placement of the slash to the nearest 1/2 em 
and dividing by 16. These calibrated certainty 
factor values were then used to generate model 
predictions for each subject. Responses to the 
12 rule items were converted to certainty 
factors by measuring the placement of the 
slash to the nearest 1/2 em, subtracting 8 from 
this value, and dividing by 8. These 
conversions insured that all ratings would be 
on the same certainty factor scale ranging from 
-1 (completely certain not to happen) to 1 
(completely certain to happen), with 0 as the 
uncertain midpoint 
Two different models were used to predict the 
human data. One employed the combination of 
best fitting algorithms from the previous 
experiments (Shultz et al., 1989): maximin 
summarizing, multiplication scaling, and 
Beckerman's modified certainty factor 
technique. For convenience, I call this the 
MMH model. Because the previous 
experiments had included so many 
unsuccessful models, it was thought 
unnecessary to replicate all of those models 
here. Just one model, suggested by the 
spontaneous comments of some subjects in the 
current experiment was used as a foil to 
MMH. This was what I call the mean model 
since it summarizes antecedent evidence within 
a rule by taking the mean certainty factor, 
scales down the maximum certainty factor in 
the conclusion by taking the mean of the 
maximum certainty factor and the summarized 
antecedent certainty factor, and combines 
certainties across rules by taking the mean. 
Mean models were included in our previous 
experiments, but were not found to be among 
the best fitting. Nonetheless, taking the mean 
is not an unreasonable strategy for people 
faced with a complex task of combining 
numerical estimates. Moreover, some subjects 
do insist that that is what they do, even if their 
data do not always confirm this introspection. 
For each subject, both the MMH and the mean 
models were used to generate the subject's 
predicted ratings of the certainty of event X 
happening on the 12 items. Each subject's 
own calibration ratings of the relevant certainty 
descriptors were used to generate these 
predictions. Then the predictions generated by 
each of the two models were correlated with 
the subject's actual certainty ratings. Many of 
these correlation coefficients were statistically 
significant at p < .05 even with only 10 df. 
Thirty-nine of the 44 MMH correlations were 
significant and 35 of the 44 mean correlations 
were significant. 
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To evaluate the relative success of the two 
tested models, the correlation coefficients were 
subjected to an analysis of variance in which 
the form of the questionnaire served as a 
between subject factor and model served as a 
within subject factor. This analysis yielded 
only a main effect for model, F(l, 42) = 
25.41, p < .001. The mean correlation for the 
MMH model was .75, and that for the mean 
model was .65. The median correlations for 
the two models were .83 and . 7 1, 
respectively. 
The mean and median correlations between the 
predictions generated by the two tested models 
were .877 and .879, respectively. With regard 
to mean correlations, the partial correlation 
between the mean model and actual data, with 
the MMH model partialled out, was -.03. With 
regard to median correlations, the partial 
correlation between the mean model and actual 
data, with the MMH model partialled out, was 
-.07. 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
The predictions generated by the MMH model 
were significantly better than those generated 
by the mean model. This replicates our 
previous results and extends them to a more 
realistic scenario in which all of the relevant 
algorithms need to function. A realistic way to 
simulate the data of human subjects in rule 
based propagation of uncertainty is to use 
maximin summarizing, multiplication scaling, 
and Beckerman's modified certainty factor 
model for combining evidence across rules. 
All of the relation between the mean model and 
subject data can be attributed to the fact that 
both were highly correlated with the 
predictions of the MMH model. With the 
MMH model predictions partialled out, the 
correlation between the mean model and 
subject data disappeared. 
A limitation of this approach is that it is 
restricted to reasoning with abstract, de­
contextualized material. Future research will 
be necessary to extend these effects to more 
realistic items. As that happens, theoretical 
ideas about the impact of context on reasoning 
under uncertainty can be developed and 
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contextualized results can be compared to the 
those generated in these abstract settings. 
Numerical approaches to reasoning under 
uncertainty (of which the certainty factor 
approach is an example) have been criticized 
for being psychologically unrealistic. Perhaps 
the most convincing version of this argument 
is provided by a recent investigation of the 
diagnostic reasoning of three expert physicians 
(Kuipers, Moskowitz, & Kassirer, 1988). 
Think-aloud and cross-examination protocols 
were obtained from these physicians as they 
analyzed a difficult medical case possessing 
numerous uncertainties. The physicians' 
references to likelihoods were typically 
categorical or ordinal and only rarely in 
explicitly numerical form. However, the 
relative rarity of numerically expressed 
likelihoods in verbal protocols does not 
preclude a mathematical account of the 
propagation of uncertainty in human 
reasoning. There are successful mathematical 
accounts of many phenomena in which the 
mathematics are not consciously represented. 
The present results, coupled with those of 
Kuipers et al. ( 1988), suggest that adequate 
mathematical models of reasoning under 
uncertainty can be achieved even if the 
combination formulas are not part of the 
subject's explicit knowledge. 
Although quite successful in accounting for 
human data, the modified certainty factor 
approach advocated here does suffer from a 
subtle flaw that needs correcting. The original 
certainty factor approach for combining 
disconfirming evidence across rules involves a 
simple summing of the two certainty factors 
(Shortliffe, 1976). Later, it was recognized 
that this could create anomalies when a 
conclusion with plenty of accumulated support 
(many rules) could be completely 
overwhelmed by a single piece of new 
evidence (one rule). Consequently, the impact 
of new disconfirming evidence was reduced 
by dividing the sum by 1 minus the minimum 
of the two absolute certainty factors. One 
difficulty is that this is a shot gun solution that 
minimizes the impact of all new evidence 
equally, no matter how much evidence has 
accumulated in favor of the alternate 
conclusion. A more precise solution would 
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take account of how much evidence had 
accumulated on each side. 
Another difficulty is that the amount of 
evidence underlying a certainty factor ought to 
affect combinations of confirming as well as 
disconfirming evidence. A more general 
solution would incorporate adjustment for 
amount of support into all updates, whether 
confirming or disconfirming. These 
adjustments might apply, for example, to 
Beckerman's ( 1986) modified certainty factor 
model. Such considerations would not have 
affected the present results, where there was 
no accumulation of evidence, but could be 
quite important in cases where evidence does 
accumulate. Development of a more precise, 
yet more generally applicable, solution to these 
problems is another topic for future 
investigation. 
Learning is another problem for approaches 
(like the present one) that build relative 
certainties directly into the knowledge 
representation. A variety of techniques have 
been developed to enable production systems 
to modify their own rule base, essentially by 
learning new rules (Klahr et al., 1987; Laird, 
Newell, & Rosenbloom, 1987). It is likely 
that the learning of maximum certainty factors 
for rule conclusions would significantly 
complicate these learning algorithms. Yet the 
effort required to dynamically adjust certainty 
factors in rule conclusions as a function of 
corrective feedback might well be worthwhile. 
A system that was sensitive to its own relative 
certainties would be more intelligent and 
effective than one which ignored such 
differences. 
The certainty factor approach to reasoning 
under uncertainty can be criticized for not 
making use of a full, optimal Bayesian 
analysis, which would take account of prior 
probabilities of the conclusion and conditional 
probabilities of the evidence given the 
conclusion. However, the certainty factor 
approach can be regarded as Bayesian under 
restricted assumptions (Beckerman, 1986; 
Wise & Henrion, 1986). The present results 
show that the consequences of these 
assumptions are not disastrous for 
psychological modeling .. Also, psychological 
experiments have reve'aled a tendency for 
people to ignore prior probabilities even if they 
are well aware of them (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1980). Furthermore, it is unlikely 
that people would typically possess the 
knowledge of prior and conditional 
probabilities required by a full Bayesian 
analysis. The most that ordinary reasoners can 
realistically be expected to know, at least 
implicitly, is how certain they are of various 
instantiated antecedent conditions and the 
maximum certainty factors contained in the 
conclusions of their production rules. 
Any of the various normative models of 
reasoning under uncertainty could be 
candidates for descriptive models of how 
ordinary people reason. Some of these 
candidates could conceivably be ruled out as 
psychological models in terms of the amount 
of prior knowledge or working memory 
capacity that they require. Those remaining 
normative models could serve as inspiration 
for descriptive psychological investigation. 
Conversely, it is also possible that 
psychological evidence might inspire or at 
least constrain the normative study of 
reasoning under uncertainty. 
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